February 2, 2014
Director Charles L. Ryan
Sir,
The
following information is submitted to you merely as a suggestion to address
staff safety at the Meadows Unit after the tragic sexual assault of a
correctional teacher in one of the classrooms. I yield to you as the director
but offer my recommendations based on my tour of duty as the former deputy warden
at that unit. Since I took the time to openly criticize the agency I felt
compelled to offer any assistance to ensure a thorough and comprehensive review
is conducted to glean and correct correctional deficiencies and or allow
changes to be made according to best practices.
First and
foremost there should be a comprehensive after-action report conducted by those
command personnel you hold responsible in the chain of command.
The report
should include but not limited to:
·
Compliance
with agency policies and procedures
·
Roster
management protocol
·
Post
Orders
·
Review
of all security post journals
·
Informational
reports logged on security issues at the unit
·
Interview
of staff assigned there for the past one year (due to rotation of staff)
·
Meadows
Unit custodial and classification requirements
The review
team should have access to all data connecting factors related to safety and
security for staff within that unit. Access to this data should include:
·
Physical
inspection of the housing units yard and classrooms and other blind spot areas
and determine if electronic surveillance technology (cameras) can be used to
augment staffing requirements for vigilance and supervision purposes.
·
A
physical inspection dealing with inmate visibility from different angles and
eliminating blind spots when officers are making their rounds.
·
A
schematic of the secluded or out of sight classrooms to see if there can be
consideration for the construction of a physical barrier to separate staff from
students during the time the class is in session.
·
The
designation for off-limits areas where only staff may enter and position
themselves in a safe and proper view and angle for the cameras and prompt
disciplinary action when appropriate.
·
Review
security and classification practices to accommodate classroom seating for the
maximum number of inmates the classroom is designed to hold - max capacity and
balance program needs with safety and security needs not exceeding the approved
ratio of one program / support staff and number approved inmates inside the designated
space at one time.
·
Determine
if there are mitigating security needs during certain times of the day and the
duration of such activity so that sound safety and security principles can
still be accomplished creating an enhanced security balance with the required
programs in place.
Since the
review will focus on current safety and security practices at the Meadows Unit
the focus must be on “how” staff accomplish those systems in place and practice
safe operational protocol that will determine the safety levels at all times.
On-Site
review emphasis should be on:
·
Examining
the current institutional inmate movement
program schedule
·
Availability
of radios [current inventories of condition and location] and radio / battery
check performed
·
Time
of arrival of all program staff
(sign-in)
·
Log
tracking radio communications with program / support staff
·
Presence
of all staff during count time
·
Accountability
of checking in keys in and out
·
Accountability
of any movement outside their assigned areas except for departure out of unit.
·
Accountability
of inmate movement to and from program building tracking number of inmates
allowed to move at one time and number of officers escorting this movement
·
General
security policy knowledge and safety protocol reviewed
·
Employee’s
knowledge of emergency plans
·
Employee’s
knowledge of radio operations
·
Staff
interviews to review knowledge of unit’s post orders and applicable Director’s
Instructions at various duty stations to include master control, yard, housing
and yard control posts. If any of these posts are collapsed or shut down, the
review team should review the priority listing of these posts to determine
whether or not this post should be placed higher on the list to shutdown or
collapse when staffing is an issue.
Primary
areas of concern:
·
Movement
call-outs, passes, main line unit control protocols
·
Changes
on call-outs to ensure current and valid call out lists
·
Change
procedure to determine supervisory review and oversight
·
Current
positions of camera placements, visibility and upgrade needs if applicable
·
Post
orders to eliminate conflicting information for staff
·
Tour
the yard and inspect the buildings for visibility, blind spots and object that
serve as barriers to line of view
·
Inspection
of security gates
Review Team
should:
·
Conduct
an accurate and update of all security documents to review staff assaults that
have occurred since 2010 in order to make a determination of the relative
frequency and severity of such incidents compared to other facilities in
similar jurisdictions or custody levels.
·
Determine
whether disclosed staff assaults are frequent or infrequent as well as overall
seriousness of such incidents and whether they are consistent with the custody
levels with which are similar to the Meadows Unit.
·
Prepare
an evaluation of security operational practices and make recommendations to
balance and or enhance practices relative to those type of incidents found
during the review.
Custody / Control Balance
·
The
review team should determine the balance of custody and control tools based on:
·
Whether
or not the environment is conducive to effective programming and treatment.
·
Determine
whether the disciplinary structure is sound and discipline and control is in
order with established disciplinary protocols showing inmates taking personal responsibility
for their behavior.
·
Determine
adequate control based on following institutional rules and regulations as they
are applied in a fair, firm and consistent manner.
·
Determine
whether the facility provides adequate and necessary control and discipline to
ensure practices in use are not contrary to balancing safety and order for all.
·
Determine
if staff are making too many accommodations that compromises measured standards
and are based on being implemented solely on inmate preference, convenience and
comfort.
Communication and Alarm
There are no
personal body alarms at Meadows. Uniformed and non-uniformed staff must depend
on direct verbal notification when possible, telephone and or their assigned
portable radio to alert main control and other staff to an immediate need for
assistance should they be confronted with a threating situation or faced with an assault that is
imminent or has already taken place.
The review
team should examine and test various radios selecting them at random and verify
the operational value of the item and report such problems if they do exist.
Since the radio does feature an alert capability in addition to the normal
radio transmission capability associated with depressing the Push to talk
button the alert feature should be tested as well.
Note:
However, there is still a vital need to verbally express the need for
assistance, give their location, and identity of the transmitting staff member.
The alert button is initiated by depressing a small red button adjacent to the
radio antenna.
The review
team should conduct an evaluation whether there is a reasonable need to enhance
existing alert system with the installation of a personal body alarm that will
activate when the staff member wears such a device on a lanyard or belt.
Note: When
activated when activated automatically alerts the institution main control room
and provides the name of the officer and the officer’s location within the institution
if the staff member advises main control of their ID number and location assigned
prior to leaving the main control.
There are
systems that feature transmitters worn by the staff that alert when the
orientation angle of the transmitter to perpendicular changes significantly
indicating that the staff wearing it has fallen or been forced or knocked to
the ground. The issue of false alarms has served to dissuade many users from
this feature.
Chemical Agents
Non- Uniformed custody staff are
not issued and subsequently do not carry on their person any force multiplier
option for their own defense in case of imminent or actual physical assault or
to rescue / defend fellow staff or inmates from such assaults. Staff currently
must rely exclusively on physical, hands on force options in such cases when
non-force options fail.
While it is certainly true that
the training provided to staff annually on defensive tactics is beneficial, it
is generally known that proficiency in the tactics taught cannot be achieved in
the limited training time designated for this purpose. The absence of physical
fitness requirements makes this a feasible alternative when staff safety is in
jeopardy.
Special note: Physical, hands on
confrontation with inmates also has the additional risk associated with the
well-established higher prevalence of communicable diseases such as HIV and
hepatitis C within the inmate population cuts, abrasions, etc. that allow for
contact with bodily fluids during a physical struggle with an inmate pose a
significant risk to staff.
Experience in units where this
tool has been put into place has been very positive with instances of abusive
use by staff occurring very rarely. Benefits in terms of staff safety and
reduction in staff and inmate physical injuries have also been observed.
Training Enhancement
As we all know, prisons are
inherently dangerous places where continuing vigilance and an appropriate level
of alertness are essential to everyone’s safety. Despite this knowledge, staff
frequently becomes complacent and too comfortable in this volatile environment.
This fact results from the
frequently routine nature of the day to day job responsibilities and the fact
that while volatility and potential violence always exist, they exist beneath
the surface and only become evident when, regrettably, it is often too late.
Frequent reinforcement by supervisors and managers of the existence of this
danger is imperative.
Custody Staffing
Particularly problematic to
maintaining adequate staffing on site and on post at all times is the currently
mandated practice of collapsing posts, pulling staff for unfunded mandates e.g.
emergency medical transports or transports unable to be completed by complex
transportation etc. and compliance with
“back lot” vehicular traffic that may take vital staff from other posts e.g.
yard and leave the assigned areas void of staff as it frequently takes up to 30
minutes to actually complete and return to the assigned post.
These breaks result in critical
areas such as the yard and housing units when being posted away from their
assigned posts thus significantly reduce vigilance and supervisory levels
during high activity time periods. The result is an “artificial” staffing
shortage that is disruptive and problematic.
The review team should conduct a
review of how all posts are deployed so the staffing is based on peak activity
areas and peak times of the day.
Single
Officer Posts – Such posts
are commonly found in all correctional units. In addition to the other staff
safety strategies discussed in this report, the risks associated with such
posts can be significantly mitigated by enhancing the inmate accountability
practices associated with them.
The predatory inmate plans for
opportunities to get a staff member alone in an isolated area. Preempting this
opportunity is critical to the safety of staffs assigned to single person
posts. Controlled and organized group movement procedures such as that
discussed are the key to mitigating the primary threat associated with these
posts.
Staff Accountability
The review team should conduct
random inspections of all staff locations assigned to the Meadows unit. Correctional
agencies have the responsibility to operate safe and secure facilities to
ensure optimum public safety, safety of staff, contractors, volunteers and
visitors who frequent their facilities. It is critical to have accurate
accountability for all staff within for daily operations as well as emergency
situations.
Miscellaneous Comments –
·
Consider
using the ID barcode to track and account for staff while inside the facility.
·
Design an
accountability process to know staff whereabouts to include all non-custody
staff.
·
Budget or
roster more staff so the units are not left with one officer during main line
and peak hours of activity, especially since that is when a lot of staff are
out for an hour for meals.
·
Balance
rosters on weekends days off and number of staff assigned to support shift
·
Stop using
inmates to repair cameras for yard and have staff doing this task.
·
More cameras
to detect what is going on in single posts and areas of limited visibility.
·
Structure inmate’s
daily activities so that officers are not absent from assigned area.
·
Too much
movement - too often sometimes without escorts
·
Bring back
daily briefings to stay updated on rules and policies changes.
·
Some staff
pencil whip logs and forms of importance, complacency.
·
Prevent
inmates having knowledge of operational changes before we do as some work in
clerical areas where discussions are ongoing.
·
Poor
visibility of supervisors e.g. Sergeants, or Lieutenants.
·
Searches of
industries area are “catch as you can”. Never time to do this area in
sufficient manner. .
·
Housing Unit
cell searches are not being done per post orders however, this does not occur because
of staffing shortages. .
·
Consistency
between shifts and supervisors as they all do it their own way literally.